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FRAUD IN THE DOD: IS THE CURRENT FRAUD PENALTY 
SYSTEM AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE TOOL? 
ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research is to assess the relationship between fraud penalties 
levied by the Department of Justice (DOJ) against defense contractors (firms) that 
commit fraud against the Department of Defense (DOD) and the effect of those penalties 
on future fraud recidivism. Using hand-collected historical data related to fraud 
committed against the DOD, we find a total of 511 fraud cases and $13.5 billion in fines 
between 1995 and 2018. An estimated regression model is used to analyze the 
relationship between fraud penalties and fraud occurrences. Multiple specifications of our 
model show little to no relationship between DOD- and DOJ-imposed fines and 
subsequent contractor fraud commission. Given the magnitude of resources deployed for 
setting and enforcing fines and penalties, the DOD should consider employing alternative 
tools to encourage compliance with procurement laws and discourage contractor fraud. 
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Procurement fraud in the U.S. government has existed since the nascence of our 
country. However, the frequency and magnitude of such frauds has grown exponentially. 
For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in 2018 that 
procurement fraud permeated over $334 billion of defense contracts between the 2012 
and 2017 fiscal years (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & 
Sustainment (OUSD[A&S], 2018). To contextualize the extent of procurement fraud, the 
DOD’s total budget in 2019 was $716 billion (Congressional Research Service, 2019). 
Despite the magnitude of procurement fraud committed by defense contractors, less than 
2% of contract amounts are recovered in civil judgements and settlements (OUSD[A&S], 
2018). The prevalence of procurement fraud naturally raises the question as to whether 
the DOD’s current penalties effectively deter contractor misbehavior. This question 
forms the basis of this paper.  
We investigate the association between DOD and Department of Justice (DOJ)-
imposed penalties on current and future contractor procurement fraud. We combine 
unclassified data from interest groups, government documents, and financial databases to 
compile our dataset. The complete dataset includes the contractor names, number of 
fraudulent occurrences per year, fraud fines paid, market to book (MTB) ratio, and size of 
the firms involved in DOD procurement fraud.1 Our final dataset includes a sample 
population consisting of 511 fraud occurrences involving 96 defense contractors and over 
$13.5 billion in fraud fines across the 23-year time period.  
We contribute to a growing body of literature on the relationship between 
penalties and fraudulent activity (Cressey 1973; Lot 1996; Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk. 
1999; Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs 2009; Karpoff 2012; Wolfe and Hermanson 2013; see 
Chapter II for a review of this literature). While a large portion of the early literature on 
fraud was theoretical in nature, more recent work has tended to be more empirical. The 
1 Data that includes contractor names, fraud occurrences per year, and fraud fines paid is across years 
1995 to 2018. MTB and size data were only obtained for years 2012 to 2017. 
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empirical estimates provided in this paper follow this trend. Our key contribution to this 
literature is that we are the first to empirically examine the longitudinal relationship 
shared between fraud fines and fraud trends in the context of procurement fraud within 
the DOD. It is our hypothesis that fraud fines have no effect on a future firm-fraud 
behavior. 
We use the variation in fines and fraud occurrences over time as our primary 
means of identification. A variety of modeling techniques are utilized such as including 
industry and yearly fixed effects in the regressions as well as including lagged terms 
depending upon specification. Our empirical tests show that fines and penalties are 
unassociated with subsequent contractor misbehavior. This result is robust to several 
alternative measurement techniques; taken together, our results suggest that fines and 
penalties (as currently deployed) are less than fully effective at disincentivizing 
contractors’ fraudulent behavior. We recommend that DOD officials may want to 
consider increasing the fine structures currently in place or consider deploying alternative 
tools to encourage compliance with procurement laws and discourage contractor fraud. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we 
describe the academic literature related to fines and fraudulent activity. In addition, we 
discuss institutional details related to fraud and procurement policies within the DOD. In 
the third chapter, we discuss the data and our empirical strategy. We then present the 
results in Chapter IV. Chapter V concludes the paper. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Multiple conflicts and military engagements since 1990 have led to a crowded 
acquisition environment, full of construction projects for expansion and revitalization, 
along with technological development for warfighters. These initiatives have continued to 
increase DOD spending: the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 DOD budget was approved in 
September 2018 for over $716 billion (Congressional Research Service, 2019). A 
significant portion of this annual DOD budget is used for the procurement of goods and 
services. DOD procurement is based on DOD need and is affected by multiple external 
factors across the world. Figure 1 shows the changes in total annual DOD budget and 
changes in procurement spending since FY2009.2  
 
Figure 1. DOD Budget from FY2009 to FY2019. Source: 
“U.S. DOD Defense Spending” (2018). 
As part of the secretary of defense’s initiative to build a more lethal force, just 
over $140 billion of the FY2019 budget was designated for DOD procurement. Those 
                                                 
2 In Figure 1, the FY2019 dollars represent the proposed DOD budget for FY2019 prior to being 
signed into law in September 2018. The final FY2019 DOD budget was $716 billion as stated in this paper. 
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procurement dollars come from taxpayers who expect the judicious spending and 
safeguarding of their hard-earned dollars. Unfortunately, DOD procurement comes with a 
significant risk of fraud committed by defense contract companies. 
A. FRAUD WITHIN THE DOD 
According to a 2018 report compiled by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 5% of the total DOD budget is lost to fraudulent activities. Based on that 
estimate, Figure 2 shows that fraud losses between FY2015 and FY2019 were expected 
to total approximately $153.8 billion (R. Bershok, personal communication, January 30, 
2019). This report is compared to information in a National Defense Authorization Act 
report from 2018, which stated that the DOD only recovered $6.2 billion in fines between 
FY2013 and FY2017. Many of these reports do not address the government’s 
inconsistency in tracking the fines and penalties imposed on the contracting agencies 
committing the fraudulent activities.  
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Figure 2. DOD Fraud Losses, FY2015 to FY2019. Source: R. 
Bershok, personal communication, January 30, 2019.3 
A closer look at the DOD fraud environment over the last 20 years reveals 
numerous instances of fraudulent transactions from the DOD’s top 10 defense 
contractors. Table 1 identifies the top 10 defense contractors, based on total contract 
awards in FY2018 and their known instances of fraud since 1995. The table also includes 
the imposed monetary penalties that these companies have had to pay as part of the fraud 
remedy system (Project on Government Oversight [POGO], 2019). 
Collectively, these companies were awarded over $154 billion by the DOD in 
FY2018 alone, and since 1995, they have committed 332 different fraud incidents and 
paid a total of $7.385 billion in penalties (POGO, 2019). Comparatively speaking, 24 
years of paid fraud penalties total only 4.8% of annual earnings from the top 10 defense 
contractors in a single year.  
 
 
                                                 
3 This image was included in a webinar on USAF Procurement Fraud on January 30, 2019. 
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Table 1. Defense Contractor Fraud since 1995. Source: POGO (2019).  
Federal Contractor FY 2018 
Contracts 
Awarded 





since 1995 ($ in 
millions) 
Lockheed Martin 40,552 86 767.5 
Boeing 29,755 70 1,459 
Raytheon 18,767 28 490 
General Dynamics 17,503 23 280 
Northrop Grumman 11,987 46 919.6 
McKesson 8,965 27 2,092 
Huntington Ingalls Industries 7,346 4 9 
BAE Systems 6,877 23 596 
Leidos Holdings 6,771 1 0 
United Technologies 6,305 24 771.5 
Total 154,833 332 7,385 
 
Congress has recognized the prevalence of fraud against the DOD and has 
requested multiple reports since 2000 to help provide a visual of the fight against fraud. 
As part of the DOD Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress required the DOD to provide a 
report of fraud-related activities between 2000 and 2010. That report was compiled with 
inputs from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Defense Criminal Investigative 
Service (DCIS). According to the Report to Congress on Contracting Fraud, there were 
approximately 64 criminal cases against defense contractors, totaling over $33 million in 
criminal fines (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]; 2011). At the time of the report, the DOJ did not report 
any criminal fines for its reported 49 cases. In addition to these criminal cases, there were 
326 civil cases with a total of $2.9 billion in civil judgments or settlements 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2011). There did not appear to be any reporting from the primary 
Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) as part of the 2011 report. 
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Congress requested similar metrics as part of the more recent FY2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA).  
Section 889 of House Resolution (H.R.) 2810 required the DOD to provide a 
report to Congress within 180 days, capturing all fraud-related incidents involving 
contractor criminal convictions, debarments, and suspensions from FY2013 to FY2017. 
The 2018 DOD report showed over 1,000 total criminal cases with subsequent fines 
totaling $368.67 million. There were over 440 total civil cases in 2018 with $5.85 billion 
collected in judgments and settlements (OUSD[A&S], 2018). 
Unlike the 2011 report, the 2018 report included fraud case information from the 
MCIOs in the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy, along with the DCIS. Both reports were part 
of a direct request from Congress; however, the feeders of fraud data appear to have been 
different for unknown reasons. Table 2 shows the data from the two reports side by side. 
The 2018 report shows a greater number of instances of fraud across five years than the 
2011 report captured across 10 years. These numbers describe an environment where the 
crime of fraud is growing in a seemingly unchecked fashion. However, despite the 
apparent trend of increasing losses, the crime of fraud is not being ignored by the DOD or 
DOJ (see Chapter IV). Rather, fraud is pervasive in the DOD environment because 
money is plentiful, and the consequences have apparently been deemed acceptable by 
deep-pocketed perpetrators.  
Table 2. Findings from DOD Fraud Reports to Congress. Adapted from 
DOD (2011); OUSD(A&S; 2018). 
 2011 DOD Report 
(2000–2010) 
2018 DOD Report 
(FY 2013–FY 2017) 
Total Criminal Cases 64 1,059 
Total Civil Cases 326 443 
Total Criminal Fines $33,389,7024 $368,670,055 
Total Settlement/Judgment $2,955,065,913 $5,858,180,290 
                                                 
4 2011 total criminal fines are a result of 15 cases as reported by the DCIS. The DOJ did not report any 
criminal fines during the review period. 
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1. DOD Environmental Factors 
Government contracting is competition-based. The Competition in Contracting 
Act (CICA) of 1984 requires that the government pursue fair and open competition for 
almost all contract activities. Competition drives innovation and helps to reduce cost as 
businesses are forced to compete for government contracts. There are few exceptions to 
the fair and open competition requirement, causing industry to compete with other 
suppliers for most contracts, regardless of a provider’s previous performance history. 
With government contracting, future contracts are not guaranteed, and as a result, 
profitability for a company may be linked to a single contract action. The need to 
generate the greatest profit on the current contract creates an incentive to reduce costs 
however possible; in some cases, that leads to lying about costs in one form or another. 
The second greatest impact on government contracting is agency theory. It has 
long stood that the principal–agent relationship can be plagued with issues due to each 
member’s individual goals. The same can be said for government contracting where the 
government is the principal and a contractor is the agent. The government’s objective is 
to secure the most effective solution to a need at a fair and reasonable price, and firms 
seek to earn a profit. So, there exists a tension between saving money and earning money. 
Additionally, the relationship is negatively affected by information asymmetry on both 
sides. The government most often knows exactly what it wants, but it doesn’t want to 
explicitly tell the contractor because it wants to see what innovation a contractor can 
introduce. The contractor knows the level of innovation that is possible but does not want 
to volunteer a solution that presents a higher cost-risk because it could negatively affect 
the contractor’s bottom line. These factors create a prisoner’s dilemma where two actors 
in a relationship are presented with two options: to pursue self-interest, equating to 
defective behavior, or to pursue the interest of the relationship and cooperate. Self-
seeking behavior costs the government additional money over time and reduces potential 
earnings for defense contractors.  
The third and final issue is purchasing volume. The DOD represents a significant 
workforce with a global mission. As a result, the government purchases countless goods 
and services each year. Between FY2013 and FY2017, the DOD participated in over 15.9 
9 
million contract actions (OUSD[A&S], 2018). The purchasing volume has overwhelmed 
the government acquisition system to the point of task saturation, creating a material 
weakness in contract oversight that presents an opportunity to commit fraud.  
2. Fraud Methods 
Defense contractors understand this environment and know how to work well 
within it. Likewise, some of the contractors with which the DOD does business use their 
knowledge to pursue self-interest at a cost to the relationship. Companies that choose to 
commit fraud often do so in one of the following ways:  
a. Defective Pricing 
The government requires accurate financial data from firms to determine which 
contractor presents a best-value solution to a government need. When contractors provide 
false financial data, the government may unwittingly chooses the wrong contractor based 
on fraudulent data. Once a contract is underway, contractors are also required to submit 
accurate financial records to the government to justify costs associated with the 
performance of government contracts. Defective pricing is one way that contractors can 
fraudulently bill the government for falsified costs relating to labor charges and/or the 
actual material used (General Services Administration [GSA], 2012).  
b. Cost Mischarging 
Contractors commit cost mischarging when they charge costs to a contract that are 
not allowable or reasonable for a particular government contract. Cost mischarging is 
often done by hiding additional charges under otherwise allowable costs such as 
contractor overhead. Contractors can also mischarge the government by shifting costs 
between contracts to one in which their profit margin may be lower than expected in an 
attempt to increase costs (GSA, 2012). 
c. Product Substitution 
Fraud through product substitution is the replacement of materials used in a good 
or service with an inferior material that fails to meet the agreed-upon product 
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specification set forth in the contract, often at a cheaper cost to the contractor (Chang, 
2013). An example of product substitution would be a contractor using a cheaper, subpar 
bolt as part of an aircraft contract, while the government pays the premium rate for the 
agreed-upon part. Fraud through product substitution is often latent and may not be 
discovered until after the product is accepted by the government (GSA, 2012). 
d. Collusion  
Collusion, a secret or illegal cooperation, is committed by members of 
government or industry through the use of gifts, gratuities, or guarantees of future 
business and employment. Often, the item of value or the promise is given by the buyer 
to the seller, in this case the government, or among sellers themselves. Contractors want 
to win government contracts because of their monetary value. Collusion is just one way 
that contractors can bypass the normal process and stack the cards in their favor (GSA, 
2012). 
e. Bid Rigging 
Bid rigging is like collusion in that it impedes the government’s ability to 
successfully utilize free and open competition in a competitive marketplace. Government 
procuring officials build a solicitation packet, and contractors bid on the project based on 
the contract requirements. Bid rigging is accomplished when potential defense 
contractors agree among themselves who will win a future bid for a contract. Four 
common bid rigging schemes are bid suppression, bid rotation, complementary bidding, 
and market division. Bid suppression occurs when a contractor agrees not to submit a bid 
for the primary contract because of a promise of money or a subcontract opportunity from 
the winning contractor. Bid rotation happens when contractors take turns on who bids the 
lower amount on future government contracts, essentially guaranteeing the lowest 
bidder’s contract award. Complementary bidding refers to contractors who submit bid 
proposals that intentionally lack the necessary solicitation requirements or are 
unreasonably high, giving the appearance that a designated contractor appears to be a 
better value to the government. Contractors can also divide the market among themselves 
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and agree to compete for certain contracts in geographical areas that are assigned to them 
(GSA, 2012).  
f. Bribery, Kickbacks, and Conflicts of Interest 
Within the contracting environment, there are individuals who pursue personal 
financial gain and take unethical actions to profit from the large dollar amounts 
associated with government contracts. One method these contractors use is bribery, or the 
presentation of gifts or any item of value with the intent to gain favor during the future 
performance of a job or a decision (GSA, 2012). Another is kickbacks, a form of reward, 
gift, or item of value that an individual receives as a result of the performance of duties in 
favor of a designated offeror. Generally, kickbacks take the form of a “commission” for 
doing business after the action has taken place and are negotiated before the illegal action 
takes place. Finally, conflicts of interest arise in government contracting when a 
government representative’s loyalty is not aligned with the government’s best interest 
(GSA, 2012). The first potential conflict of interest could derive from continual 
interactions as part of a long-term government contracting relationship. Second, 
government–industry transfers are not uncommon, as individuals often leave jobs in 
industry to take jobs in government, and vice versa. Last, family relationships can also 
pose issues when members are affiliated across different contract stakeholders. Other 
potential conflicts of interest include stocks owned in industry or part-time employment 
positions (Chang, 2013). The overarching theme of this type of fraud is that the 
government representative stands to gain personally from any contractual deals with 
industry. 
3. Fraud Remedies 
Fraud remedies consist primarily of administrative actions, a criminal conviction, 
or civil settlements. These remedies can affect a contractor’s eligibility to perform 
contracts for the government, require them to pay fines, or require jail time for 
individuals.  
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a. Administrative Actions 
Contracting officers have a great deal of latitude in how they perform contract 
functions, including contract management. Contracting officers must make fair and 
reasonable decisions, while acting as a type of judge on contract issues. Due to this 
requirement, when approved by leadership, contracting officers have the authority to 
execute administrative actions such as those described in the following sections 
(Department of the Air Force, 2004). 
(1) Suspension 
The government has the power to suspend a contract company’s ability to hold 
contracts with the federal government under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 
Subpart 9.4, Debarment, Suspension, and Ineligibility. A suspension is often for a period 
of 12 months or less, and it deems the contractor ineligible for new contracts with the 
federal government. A suspension is based on “adequate evidence” of contractor 
misconduct and remains in effect throughout the duration of any investigation or legal 
proceeding. Examples of contractor misconduct that would warrant suspension are fraud-
related behavior, violations of other federal or state antitrust laws, violations of the Drug-
Free Workplace Act of 1988, or lack of integrity or honesty that diminishes contractor 
responsibility (Department of the Air Force, 2004). 
(2) Debarment 
Debarment is more serious than a suspension in that contractors are debarred from 
accessing the installation where the company was previously performing the contract 
work. Suspension prevents future awards; however, debarments impact current contracts. 
Debarments are often issued if a contractor is convicted of a fraud-related crime, fraud-
related civil action, or any misconduct that may affect the contractor’s responsibility. 
Debarments are generally applied to a contractor for no more than three years under FAR 
Subpart 9.406-4, Period of Debarment (Department of the Air Force, 2004). Examples of 
misconduct that would warrant a debarment are similar to those for suspension; however, 
debarment is less frequent and often follows a criminal conviction. 
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b. Criminal Action 
When fraud investigations reveal the specific individual who is responsible for the 
fraudulent conduct, criminal charges can be filed against that person. According to the 
United States Attorney’s Manual (DOJ, 2018), the primary criminal charges include the 
following: 
False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001) - A contractor can be charged with making 
false statements if he or she “(1) knowingly falsifies, conceals, or covers up a material 
fact by any trick, scheme, or device; (2) makes false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements 
or representations; or (3) makes or uses any false documents or writings within the 
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the U.S.” 
False Claims (18 U.S.C. § 287) - A contractor can be charged with making false 
claims if he or she “knowingly presents or makes any false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
claims against any agency or department of the U.S.” 
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C § 1341) or Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C § 1343) - A contractor 
can be charged with mail fraud if he or she has an intent to defraud and uses any U.S. 
mail system as a means of communication to facilitate such fraud. Likewise, wire fraud 
involves the use of any wire such as a telephone or other electronic means across a wire 
such as a computer to complete a fraud scheme against a target (DOJ, 2018). 
Conspiracy to Defraud the U.S. Government (18 U.S.C § 371) - A contractor can 
be charged with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government if he or she “agrees with 
another individual to defraud the U.S. or to violate any federal law or regulation when at 
least one act is taken in furtherance of the agreement.” 
Civil action can be pursued against an individual or company if they commit a 
civil False Claims Act violation (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) for payment to the U.S. 
government either knowingly or with reckless disregard. The potential civil penalties for 
a False Claims Act violation include treble damages plus damages equal to $5,500 to 
$11,000 for each false claim (GSA, 2012). We reviewed past research to understand why 
defense firms or individuals would commit fraud against the DOD, given all the potential 
penalties.  
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B. FRAUD LITERATURE 
There are two primary theories that explain the basic elements of fraud. The Fraud 
Triangle (1973) suggests that fraud is accomplished when three basic elements intersect 
at the same time (Cressey, 1973). Cressey (1973) suggested that the three basic elements 
of fraud are opportunity, incentive or pressure, and rationalization. 
Opportunity occurs when an individual perceives a breakdown in internal controls 
or oversight. A breakdown in these areas provides a window or method for 
accomplishing the fraudulent act. It is the weakness in any system that allows the theft to 
occur. Incentive/pressure is created when the individual feels he or she has a financial 
need or want. A financial need can be attributed to events or hardships in life or can also 
be manufactured internally as part of personal greed. Rationalization succeeds whenever 
individuals are able to convince themselves that it is okay to commit the crime, and it can 
be gained by believing that fraud is a victimless crime or by assuming that the risks of 
perpetrating the crime are worth it in the end.  
A prevailing theory referred to as the Fraud Diamond was developed in 
furtherance of Cressey’s (1973) theory, further explains the three elements of fraud, and 
introduces a fourth element: capability. Wolfe and Hermanson (2013) opined that in 
addition to rationalization, opportunity, and incentive, capability is what allows the 
successful perpetration of fraud (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2013). Only with the proper 
capability can a person rationalize the crime, have an incentive to commit it, and also 
recognize a weakness in controls or security measures that provides the opportunity 
(Wolfe & Hermanson, 2013). With these four elements present at the same time, the risk 
of fraud is high. Past research demonstrates that the opportunity element of fraud may be 
higher than DOD acquisition professionals are willing to admit. 
In April 2013, a survey was conducted within the U.S. Army contracting agency 
procurement workforce and included responses from 99 members whose workforce 
experience ranged from two to over 20 years of workforce experience. The survey 
consisted of a 26 knowledge-based questions and 12 perception questions that dealt with 
the organization’s internal controls and the its internal structure, culture, and processes 
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regarding risk to fraudulent activity. On the assessment, the average score for questions 
answered correctly was 69.8%. This information was paired with the same surveyed 
members’ responses on questions regarding the organization’s vulnerability to fraud 
within internal controls and fraud schemes. Survey responses showed that 38% of 
respondents answered that they did not suspect fraud within the internal control 
component of their organization and 53% of respondents stated they did not suspect fraud 
schemes in their organization (Rendon & Rendon, 2015).  
By analyzing this sample of DOD procurement workforce members, one sees that 
the current knowledge of the Army contracting agency procurement workforce is creating 
the opportunity for potential criminal and fraudulent activity by defense contractors. This 
opportunity exists because of the disparity in knowledge versus awareness of the 
procurement workforce members that creates a large potential for oversight of typical 
fraud schemes to be used within defense contracts.  
Another area of focus for our review includes the incentives for firms and firm 
management to commit fraudulent actions. Prior literature shows that incentives increase 
a firm’s propensity to commit fraud. Specifically, Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, 
and Riley (2013) underlined the immense pressure to commit fraud created by a firm’s 
management team and the incentives it uses to drive performance. However, it should be 
noted that no direct relationship was identified between management’s use of aggressive 
accounting and management rewards. Instead of a clear relationship between 
management incentives and firm growth, Trompeter et al. (2013) state that the external 
pressure of a person’s social environment may be to blame. 
Trompeter et al. (2013) argued that General Strain Theory may be a significant 
aspect of fraud. General Strain Theory proposes that potential stressors of an individual’s 
social environment and need to maintain a certain social status could cause one to indulge 
in criminal behavior and fraudulent activities within a firm. This type of social-induced 
pressure, compounded with an opportunity to commit fraud, and an individual’s ability to 
rationalize the behavior is a picture-perfect risk environment according to the Fraud 
Triangle. Keeping the firm’s social environment in mind, organizations must strive to 
develop continuous fraud awareness training and employ fraud-detection methods. This 
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process will continue to show members in a firm that fraud at any level is wrong and will 
deter potential frauds by removing an individual’s ability to rationalize the behavior as 
good or acceptable. In addition to personal and professional incentives for fraud, 
researchers have also theorized about the fraud penalty system.  
The wrist-slap hypothesis suggests that current and past penalties for those who 
commit fraud against the government are merely a slap on the wrist and do little to affect 
the perpetrators themselves or prevent fraud recidivism (Karpoff et al., 1999). The 
penalties that are imposed against companies are simply too small to have a positive 
effect. Defense contract companies represent a small group of businesses, an oligopoly, 
where there are only a few distinct sellers that can supply the sought-after good or 
service. In some cases, a single company acts as a monopoly and is the sole provider. As 
a result, the government is less inclined to inflict severe penalties due to the criticality of 
these contractors. Additionally, the abundance of work, time, and skill required to pursue 
each fraud occurrence across the volume of contract actions surpasses government 
resources. As previous DOD Inspector General Joseph Sherick stated, the government is 
“outmatched by the defense contractors” (Dwyer, 1986, p. 75). 
Even when employed, fraud remedies have limitations, and as the wrist-slap 
hypothesis suggests, remedies may be more for show than for actual effect. In 1989, 
Boeing mishandled DOD planning documents, and the Washington, DC, office was 
debarred from performing government contracts. This office did not provide any goods or 
services to the government, so the impact on Boeing was immaterial (Wartzman, 1989). 
In a case against General Dynamics, the government suspended the company, but on the 
day the suspension was lifted, the company received new government contracts totaling 
$892.2 million (Carrington, 1985). In addition to those contracts, the government began 
pushing through a backlog of projects and contracts for the General Dynamics company 
(“General Dynamics Led Defense Firms,” 1987). 
Another theory is known as the influential contractor hypothesis. The oligopoly–
monopsony relationship between defense contractors and the government creates an 
environment where true justice cannot be pursued due to mutual harm. The larger, more 
critical defense contractors retain great wealth and influence due to the necessary goods 
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and services they are able to provide to the DOD. The result is a justice system where 
fraud penalties are levied more heavily against non-critical defense contractors as a 
means of creating an example, thereby transferring a greater margin of wealth, influence, 
and dependence to large contract companies (Karpoff et al., 1999).  
The last theory surrounding fraud penalties is the deterrent hypothesis, and it 
suggests that fraud penalties effectively deal with fraud. In fact, there are some opinions 
that suggest that fraud penalties have become too great and now pose a threat to defense 
contract companies and the procurement environment (Karpoff et al., 1999). Higher 
penalties can have varying degrees of effectiveness when imposed on a small business, 
potentially leading to bankruptcy. Alternatively, the effect is significantly different for a 
large defense contractor who has the ability to pay the fines. We believe our research 
provides data points that specifically address the deterrent hypothesis. In addition to the 
effect of imposed fines, multiple works address the potential reputational impacts that 
affect firms that commit fraud or misconduct. 
A 1996 discussion paper written by John Lott (1996), University of Chicago Law 
School, states that “the optimal criminal fine for fraud will be zero” (p. 363), meaning 
that externalities like positive or negative reputation greatly affect the firms committing 
fraud. Lott explained throughout the paper that higher fines would likely cause increases 
to overall price in the market to outweigh any potential fines paid by firms in the future. 
Subsequently, prices would increase for customers (the government in this case) who 
purchase services from private firms. On the other hand, if a firm’s reputation is damaged 
with negative actions—fraud, for instance—the firm will have a difficult time obtaining 
additional work or providing services to new customers (Lott, 1996).  
Lott (1996) also discusses the use of fines and reputation working together as 
simultaneous punishments towards firms that commit fraudulent actions. He wrote: “In a 
world with both fines and reputation, firms are indifferent to committing fraud as long as 
the firm’s reputation plus fines equals the short-term gain that the firm can get from 
cheating” (Lott, 1996, p. 365). Lott essentially stated that regardless of the penalties 
imposed, if the damage to the firm is short-term, the firm will justify fraudulent actions as 
a cost of doing business. We believe this to be evident in our research.  
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A 2009 study examined the external effects of alleged fraud or corporate 
misconduct on a firm’s reputation through impacts on profitability and risk (Murphy et 
al., 2009). Profitability was determined based on earnings projections and actual reported 
earnings. Risk was assessed based on the volatility of stock due to deviations in 
forecasted earnings. The study concluded that profitability and risk generally shared an 
inverse relationship following allegations of corporate misconduct or fraud. The changes 
in profitability and risk suggest reputational impacts brought on by fraud, though the 
magnitude of the impact is dependent on the degree of effect on firm value (Murphy et 
al., 2009).  
A firm’s future business may be diminished by corporate misconduct, though 
Karpoff (2012) pointed out additional factors that affect the severity of any impact. In 
2012, Karpoff sought to assess the extent of reputational effect on a firm that has 
committed corporate misconduct or fraud. His review noted a significant reputational 
impact among companies involved in financial representation and consumer fraud, versus 
companies merely engaged in environmental violations. In some instances, the monetary 
value of the reputational effect exceeded that of imposed criminal fines or lawsuits 
(Karpoff, 2012). Karpoff (2012) opined that a firm’s reputational effect was greatest 
when a firm’s perfunctory behavior caused a customer to alter contract terms, thereby 
resulting in a diminished profit margin and potentially higher costs. Again, the gradation 
of reputational impact was greatly moved by the type of misconduct and the relationship 
the buyer and seller share (Karpoff, 2012). While the relationship between reputation and 
misconduct may be real in the general market, we submit that no such relationship exists 
within DOD acquisition due to the oligopoly–monopsony relationship already discussed. 
Despite the many who suggest that negative impacts on firm reputation are in themselves 
a penalty, we argue that such a penalty is not acceptable in the absence of feasible 
substitutes, such is the case for the DOD’s largest providers. There is no diminished 
future business potential in an environment where future business is all but assured.  
A closer look at specific effects on firm reputation through an analysis of firm 
share price presents findings that are in line with the current business relationship 
between the DOD and defense firms. In 1999, researchers evaluated the overall economic 
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effect of fraud and fraud remedies on defense contractors’ stock prices. The study 
included a review of 98 contractor companies involved in an aggregate 249 cases of 
alleged procurement fraud from 1983 to 1995 (Karpoff et al., 1999). Of the 98 
companies, most were bigger firms, which is reasonable given the number of contract 
actions awarded to large defense contractor firms. The volume of contracts awarded to 
larger firms represents a higher risk for potential fraud actions. During the 12-year review 
period by Karpoff et al. (1999), stock price fluctuations were also evaluated central to 
periods of time surrounding press releases that revealed allegations of fraud. A total of 
396 press releases were revealed, including an additional review of stock prices that was 
conducted as part of any follow-up press releases that reported indictments, suspensions, 
or fines (Karpoff et al., 1999). 
The results of the study showed a significant difference on stock price changes 
among companies within the top 100 defense contractors, versus companies that were 
considered to be smaller providers of DOD services. Among those outside of the top 100, 
there was a significant change to stock price following a press release announcing the 
company’s fraud. However, stock price changes were not significant among companies 
that were part of the top 100 defense contractors. Karpoff et al. (1999) theorized that 
stock price change differences between the two distinct groups of DOD providers were 
directly related to the influential contractor hypothesis. Large firms of a critical nature to 
the DOD were less affected by fraud, mostly due to their assured continued business in 
the future. However, smaller firms were more at risk to losing DOD business because of 
fraudulent activities. The stock price changes among those companies showed that 
shareholders questioned the survival of the smaller firms (Karpoff et al., 1999).  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
As part of our research, we gathered unclassified data from interest groups, 
government records, and financial databases that included data across a 23-year period 
from 1995 to 2018. Our primary data source includes information collected and 
maintained by a government watchdog group, the Project on Government Oversight 
(POGO). POGO collects and distributes information regarding DOD federal contractor 
misconduct data via the website Contractor Misconduct. POGO has reported the 
information annually based on DOJ press releases. The data includes the contractor 
names, fraud occurrences per year, and the annual fraud penalties paid by firms. The 
website provides historical contractor misconduct data going back to 1995 and up to 
2019.5 In addition to data obtained from POGO, we collected our control variables for 
MTB and Size from the Compustat database. 
A. SAMPLE DATA 
Our sample population included a total of 552 fraudulent occurrences involving 
111 contractors from 1995 to 2018. We discovered that several of the contract companies 
had merged during the review period, so only companies that remained intact in 2018 
were included in the final sample population. We sought to ensure that any collected data 
would be standardized to make accurate comparisons between identified firms and firm 
years. After excluding mergers and companies that went out of business, 511 fraud 
occurrences involving 96 defense contract companies and approximately $13.5 billion in 
fraud fines remained in the sampling. Figure 3 shows the trend data based on the total 
fraud occurrences each year within the sample population. Additionally, Figure 4 shows 
the trend data based on the total fraud fines collected each year within the sample 
population. 
                                                 
5 We elected to only include data between years 1995 and 2018 to avoid truncated data in 2019. 
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Figure 3. Sample Population Summary—Total Fraud Cases 
per Year. Source: POGO (2019). 
 
Figure 4. Sample Population Summary—Total Fines per Year 




















































































































After collecting the fraud/firm/year data, we sorted all firms by the years in which 
the fraudulent activity took place and searched through the contract award records of 
USAspending.gov to gather a sampling of non-fraud contractors who held active 
government contracts during our review period.6 In order to create standardized 
monetary amounts for the award fees within USAspending.gov, we used the “Obligated 
Amounts” from the downloadable data sets for each firm and year. This financial 
information was chosen because it allowed for completeness without relying on projected 
contract award amounts.7 
Control variables were extracted from Compustat, a database that maintains 
financial, statistical, and market information on global companies, to extract necessary 
variables for our analysis. Compustat provided relevant financial and market information 
for the sample population contract companies including market cap and total assets per 
contractor by year between years 2012 and 2017. We used these data points to formulate 
variables within our model for the purpose of comparing companies similar in size. Data 
was also collected from USAspending.gov to determine which companies had active 
contract activities with the DOD between 2012 and 2017. In addition to these data 
sources, we spoke with multiple military investigators and legal teams who specialize in 
procurement fraud, all of whom verified aspects of the sample population data. 
After completing a cross-sectional review of all variables and controls, we 
conducted a regression analysis on year periods 2012 to 2017. We determined that this 
five-year period contained the most complete data from POGO, USAspending.gov, and 
Compustat.8 During the five-year review period, we analyzed 213 fraud firm-year 
observations with 808 non-fraud firm-year observations for variability. We used these 
observations, along with the collected control variables to test our null hypothesis that the 
current magnitude of fraud fines has no effect on firm behavior or future fraud by firms.  
                                                 
6 USAspending.gov is an unclassified, open source federal spending database that provides 
transparency to taxpayers on how the federal government spends tax dollars. 
7 USAspending.gov only provided contract award data for contract companies by year starting in 2008 
through 2019.  
8 Portions of the Compustat data was extracted from Hermis (2019). 
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As presented in Table 3, our data included a total of 1,021 observations that 
included a dependent fraud variable and independent fine variable. As mentioned, we 
also included control variables for firm size and MTB for normalization. While the 
commission of fraud was measured with a 1 or 0, the average fraud measure per firm-
year was 0.784. Fines showed an average fine amount of over $4.7 million with a 
maximum fine paid of $1.67 billion. The standard deviation for fines was $63.4 million. 
The mean coefficient for size measured 6.599, while the mean for MTB resulted in 
16.634. 
Table 3.  Summary Statistics on Fraud Occurrence and Fine Amount, 2012–
2017 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
Fraud 1,021 0.784 0.412 0 1 
Fines 1,021 $4,789,163 $6.34e+07 0 $1.67e+09 
Size 1,021 6.599 3.269 -5.116 14.447 
MTB 1,021 16.634 288.241 -3155.393 4463.306 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
To estimate the effect of fines on current and later fraud, we used the variation in 
fines and fraud occurrences across time as our primary means of identification. Our 
formal mathematical equation is as follows: 
Fraudi,t = ∝+β1Penaltiesi,t+β2Sizei,t+β3MTBi,t+β4GovSalesi,t+Indi+Yeart+εi,t        (1) 
Where “Fraud” is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 if company i in year t 
committed fraud and 0 otherwise. “Penalties” refers to the amount of fines paid by 
contractor i in year t.9 “Size” is the natural logarithm of total assets of contractor i in year 
t. “MTB” refers to the market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity for form 
                                                 
9 Fraud and Penalties were extracted from POGO; Penalties were scaled by total assets using 
Compustat. 
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i in year t.10 “GovSales” is contractor i’s government sales in year t.11 “Ind” refers to 
industry dummies and is a series of indicator variables for the two-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) code. “Year” refers to a year dummies and is a series of 
indicator variables per year. Standard errors are bootstrapped because small clusters can 
erroneously impact the coefficient’s interpretation (Klein & Santos, 2012).  
The control variables help us measure factors most likely to have an impact on a 
firm’s likelihood of fraud occurrence and magnitude of the fraud penalties. Size attempts 
to capture firm-specific characteristics that might otherwise be unobservable. MTB helps 
control for a difference in a firm’s growth across years, where a high MTB value of 
equity is defined as high growth. GovSales controls for firms that may be heavily 
dependent on government contracts. Ind and Year control for unobservable factors related 
to invariant industry and time. Additionally, we used a variation of the equation that 
substituted a one-to-five-year lag for all independent variables. The lag inclusion is 
important because the previous year’s profit could affect a firm’s economic need to 
commit fraud. Finally, we estimate a variation of Equation 1 with a three-year rolling 
window. A rolling window is necessary because fraud investigations are time and labor 
intensive. Fraud fines paid by a firm could be the results of fraud committed three to five 
years prior to the actual fine.  
                                                 
10 Size and MTB were taken from Compustat. 
11 GovSales data was pulled from USAspending.gov and scaled by total assets using Compustat. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Using a variety of specifications, our analysis shows that paid fraud fines paid 
have little to no relationship on current or future fraud-firm behavior. Our regression 
analysis uses Equation 1 with combined data from POGO, USAspending.gov, and 
Compustat. The time period for analysis includes data from 2012 to 2017 and includes a 
total of 1,021 firm-year observations. 
A. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Table 4 depicts the results from Equation 1. Column 1 in Table 4 shows the 
regression results with zero controls. Column 2 adds in the control variables Size and 
MTB. Columns 3 and 4 add in Industry and Year fixed effects, respectively. Column  5 
includes the full set of controls and fixed effects for Industry, Year, and Firm. The 
coefficient of interest is Fines which shows the effect between fines and fraud in future 
calendar years. 
Table 4. Analysis Results with Control Variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fines -2.57e-10 -2.91e-10 -2.84e-10 -3.18e-10 -7.32e-10 
 (9.03e-11)*** (1.13e-10)*** (2.21e-10) (1.55e-9) (6.84e-10) 
Size No -0.003 -0.001> -0.003 -0.018 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.053) 
MTB No 0.001> 0.001> 0.001> -0.001> 
  (0.001>) (0.001>) (0.001>) (0.001>)* 
Industry Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No Yes 
R2 0.002 0.002 0.058 0.144 0.008 
Observations 1,021 1,021 1,021 1,021 1,021 
Notes: Coefficients denoted with * represent a p-value of 5–10%. Coefficients denoted with ** 
represent  a p-value of 1–5%. Coefficients denoted with *** represent a p-value of less than 1%.  
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The results from Table 4 show little to no relationship between fines and fraud. 
The point estimates in columns 1 through 5 for Fines range in value from  
-0.000000000732 to -0.000000000257. In terms of interpretation, these estimates suggest 
that a $1 increase in fines is associated with an increase in the probability of fraud by 
between -0.000000000732% and -0.000000000257%. The coefficients for Fines in 
columns 1 and 2 are both statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns 3 through 5 
show no statistical significance at any level for Fines. Our preferred estimates are 
displayed in column 5. The point estimate in column 5 for Fines is -0.000000000732 and 
not statistically significant at any standard level.  
Adding in fixed effects for Industry appears to control for a significant amount of 
the variation in the results for Fines. After Industry is controlled for in the regressions, 
the point estimates for Fines in columns 3 through 5 coalesce around a small negative 
range of values between -0.000000000284 and -000000000732. All of the coefficients for 
Fines across the specifications are economically insignificant since they are close to zero 
in magnitude. Overall, the results from Table 4 show that fines have little to no effect on 
fraud in the subsequent calendar years. 
Table 5 shows the results from Equation (1) when lagged variables are introduced 
on the right-hand side of the equation. In this table, each of the columns include the full 
set of controls and fixed effects for Industry, Year, and Firm. Column 1 lags each of the 
independent variables by one year, column 2 lags the variables by two years, etc., up until 
column 5 which lags all of the independent variables by five years. The interpretation of 
the coefficients in Table 5 is the same as Table 4 except that Table 5’s coefficients show 
the relationship between fines and subsequent fraud found in later years. 
The results from Table 5 largely mirror those of Table 4. Table 5 shows little to 
no relationship between fines and subsequent fraud in later years. The point estimates for 
Fines in Table 5 are all statistically insignificant and range in value from  
-0.0000000000919 and 0.0000000000861. These estimates suggest that a $1 increase in 
fines is associated with an increase in the probability of subsequent fraud by between  
-0.0000000000919% and 0.0000000000861% depending upon specification. 
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Fines 3.03e-10 -9.19e-11 8.61e-11 1.30e-10 -8.22e-11 
 (4.23e-10) (1.93e-10) (7.30e-11) (1.06e-10) (9.02e-11) 
Size 0.008 0.004 0.015 0.013 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)** (0.007)* (0.008) 
MTB 0.001> -0.001> -0.001> -0.001> 0.001> 
 (0.001>) (0.001>) (0.001>)* (0.001>)** (0.001>)*** 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.028 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.029 
Observations 1,020 1,019 1,018 1,017 1,016 
Notes: Coefficients denoted with * represent a p-value of 5–10%. Coefficients denoted with ** 
represent a p-value of 1–5%. Coefficients denoted with *** represent a p-value of less than 1%.  
 
In results not shown, the estimates in Table 5 are found to be robust across a 
number of different specifications including (or excluding) the full set of controls and 
fixed effects for Industry, Year, and Firm. In particular, the coefficient on Fines is robust 
across all of the specifications, showing little to no relationship between fines and 
subsequent fraud for firms in our dataset. The results from Table 5 show the coefficient 
on Fines to be both economically and statistically insignificant across all of the 
specifications when the full set of controls and fixed effects for Industry, Year, and Firm 
are included in the regressions. Overall, the results from Table 5 show little to no 
relationship of fines on fraud in subsequent calendar years. 
B. DISCUSSION 
Our research indicated that fraud fines have no effect on subsequent firm-fraud 
behavior. External factors that could have an impact on our findings include: penalties are 
too low, fraud policies throughout the DOD and DOJ have changed, there have been 
changes in procurement spending, there is a revolving door between government and 
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industry, and the value of money decreases over time. These theories or external factors 
are not all-inclusive. Outside of the literature and immediate contracting environment, 
however, these points should be considered when discussing possible effects on these 
results. 
The first and most obvious factor affecting our results may be that the fraud 
penalties themselves are too inconsequential to change firm behavior. Our findings refute 
the deterrent hypothesis and support both the influential contractor hypothesis and wrist-
slap hypothesis. Defense contractors within the top 100 defense firms may be too big to 
fail from a financial penalty standpoint. Given the large profit margins, the penalty 
magnitude could very well be part of the firm’s end-of-year profit equation through an 
estimated loss contingency.  
The fact is, suspension and debarment are not real options for top 100 firms and 
even when employed, are half measures due to the waiver process, allowing firms to 
continue operating for the government. As such, financial penalties must be effective as 
the primary means of remuneration for fraud among critical firms. However, the results 
of our analysis show that the current measure of fraud fines has no impact on firm 
behavior or the commission of fraud.  
Our second potential external factor is fraud policy changes in the DOD and DOJ. 
The first area of policy we researched and analyzed alongside our data was the Panel on 
Contracting Integrity 2007 Report to Congress. This panel produced 21 recommendations 
for 2008, to be accomplished across four areas including: the reinforcement of 
functionally independent contracting employees with the use of qualified contracting 
leadership, fully identify the appropriate amount of contracting workforce employees 
with the correct skill sets and experience, develop a standardized DOD contracting policy 
plan, and increase the level of education, training, and planning used in contingent 
contracting (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OUSD[AT&L], 2007). 
Additionally, in order to better support the review of integrity issues within 
contracting, the panel established 10 subcommittees that also provided additional 
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recommendations. Subcommittee 6, Sufficient Contract Surveillance, chaired by the 
deputy assistant secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management), 
established the following initial actions for implementation in 2008: evaluate the current 
functions of contracting office representatives (CORs) and establish a standardized 
certification for CORs within the DOD, ensure COR assignment takes place prior to 
contract award, and create a process for COR nominations to be approved through 
organization management. This approval is accomplished by requiring written letters 
stating that CORs have the needed resources for their positions and that a member’s COR 
duties will be reportable on their employee performance assessments (OUSD[AT&L], 
2007). These initial actions were focused on building a better method of continuous 
contract surveillance and a more regulated and standardized use of CORs in government 
contracting. 
The second area of policy we analyzed alongside our data points was a memo 
authored by the Office of Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates titled “Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing” signed on September 9, 2015. This memo 
outlined six areas in which the DOJ should refocus the U.S. Attorney’s Manual for all 
future investigations of corporate wrongdoing. Specifically, the Yates memo addressed 
the need for continued focus on corporate participation with fraud investigations, and the 
need to pursue the individuals responsible, where practicable (Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General, 2015). 
First, “to be eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the 
Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct” 
(Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 2015, p. 3). Any corporations that want to 
receive cooperation consideration must be complete and truthful with all relevant facts 
concerning the individual’s misconduct. Providing that the corporation meets the required 
threshold criteria, the amount of extended cooperation credit shall remain dependent on 
the traditional factors applied to the assessment, including the firm’s cooperation 
timeliness, proactivity of the cooperation, and swiftness of internal investigations related 
to the matter. 
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Second, “both criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on 
individuals from the inception of the investigation” (Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General, 2015, p. 4). Criminal and civil attorneys should concentrate on cases built 
against specific wrongdoers as corporations can act only through the individuals within 
them. This step maximizes the chances of criminal or civil charges being found against 
the individual who committed the wrongdoing and not only the corporation. 
Third, “criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in 
routine communication with one another” (Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 2015, 
p. 4). This aims to build upon the relationships between civil and criminal attorneys, 
especially those who could be working on concurrent criminal and civil investigations 
involving corporate wrongdoing. This includes a notification system between civil and 
criminal attorneys regarding cases that could potentially become concurrent 
investigations.  
Fourth, “absent extraordinary circumstances, no corporate resolution will provide 
protection from criminal or civil liability for any individuals” (Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General, 2015, p. 5). In a situation where the DOJ resolves matters with a 
corporation for wrongdoing, attorneys should continue investigations and resolutions 
involving specific individuals. A key point of this step is that “department lawyers should 
not agree to a corporate resolution that includes an agreement to dismiss charges against, 
or provide immunity for, individual officers or employees” (Office of the Deputy 
Attorney General, 2015, p. 5). These types of criminal or civil liability releases must be 
personally officiated by the proper assistant attorney general or U.S. attorney (Office of 
the Deputy Attorney General, 2015). 
Fifth, “corporate cases should not be resolved without a clear plan to resolve 
related individual cases before the statute of limitations expires and declinations as to 
individuals in such cases must be memorialized” (Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
2015, p. 6). In the event a corporate case is resolved, attorneys must have a documented 
investigative plan for all potentially liable individuals involved prior to any statute of 
limitations periods expiring. Additionally, any postponements in a corporate level 
investigation should not affect the exposure of potentially culpable individuals. 
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Sixth, “civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the 
company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on considerations 
beyond that individual’s ability to pay” (Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 2015, p. 
6). Essentially, an individual’s financial status should not stand as the controlling factor 
in decision-making for pursuance of a civil suit against him or her. Instead, factors such 
as whether the individual’s actions were serious and actionable, or if pursuing the actions 
would reflect key federal interest, should be considered. This is similar to when 
prosecuting attorneys evaluate an individual’s previous misbehavior, previous 
circumstances, and any additional background information leading to the event of 
misconduct.  
In addition to changes in DOD and DOJ policy, changes in procurement spending 
contracts may affect the propensity for fraud. The DOD has been involved in multiple 
engagements and projects since 2000, all of which have affected the number of contract 
activities and procurement spending for goods and services. The U.S. government tracks 
procurement contract expenditures above the micro-purchase threshold of $3,500 in the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). According to the FPDS, DOD contract 
expenditures increased sharply by $265 billion between FY2000 and FY2008. Following 
the sharp spike, DOD procurement spending decreased by $170 billion from FY2009 to 
FY2015 (Schwartz, Sargent, Nelson, & Coral, 2016).  
Large fluctuations in contract expenditures, an increase of 142% between FY2000 
and FY2008, followed by a 38% decrease between FY2009 and FY2015, have a notable 
impact on the environment where contracting fraud is probable to transpire. It is 
reasonable to accept that the risk of fraud occurrences increases as total spending and 
contract activities increase. Likewise, as contract activities and procurement spending 
decrease, the pool for potential fraud activities also diminishes.  
In addition to the factors already discussed, the revolving door or brass parachute 
effect, could also have an impact on fraud and continued business dealings between the 
DOD and defense firms. It has long been the practice of businesses to acquire personnel 
from their competing business entities or regulatory bodies that oversee respective 
business practices. It is understandable why this headhunter tactic is employed and is 
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successful. When companies or entities routinely do business with one another, it is 
advantageous to bring someone over who understands the other company’s environment. 
Furthermore, new employees likely have remaining contacts at their point of origin, 
which can make future business easier to secure or maintain. This practice also happens 
with defense firms and DOD leadership. Members of the DOD acquisition workforce, 
including members of the secretary of defense’s office, have moved over from defense 
firms and vice versa. 
According to the POGO (2018), in FY2016, companies in the top 20 defense 
contractors hired over 645 former government leaders, members of Congress, and 
military officers. In FY2016, firms onboarded military officers including “25 Generals, 9 
Admirals, 43 Lieutenant Generals, and 23 Vice Admirals” (POGO, 2018, p. 9). Those 
new hires were brought over as lobbyists, senior executives, or board members. Of those, 
approximately 95 instances consisted of senior DOD officials who went to work directly 
for the top five defense contractors, including (in alphabetical order): Boeing, General 
Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon (POGO, 2018).  
These post-military positions are highly valued and often extremely lucrative. As 
such, senior military leaders who hope to transition into industry post-military stand to 
suffer professionally if they speak out against defense contractors. There are numerous 
notable instances of the revolving door in past and current senior-level DOD positions, as 
well as positions in the DOD acquisition community. Many of these appointed 
individuals have decades of experience in their prior careers with firms who have a long 
standing relationship with DOD procurement. The aforementioned facts in no way infer 
any wrongdoing, but instead are meant to demonstrate the close relationship that the 
DOD and defense firms share, despite the apparent trends of fraud. These types of 
relationships may embolden influential contractors through the perception of assured 
future business dealings within the DOD contracting arena. 
Lastly, the effect of time on the value of money may have an impact on fraud 
trends as defense firms recognize that committing fraud today costs them less in the 
future. The benefit of fraud today may outweigh the cost of fraud tomorrow. For 
example, if a company were to commit contract fraud today for $1 million, it would stand 
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to profit immediately by $1 million. Fraud investigations are time- and labor-intensive 
and can take as long as three to five years to prosecute. Most often, defense firms choose 
to settle the case outside of criminal court. In our example, a three-to-five-year period 
could also incur 6–10% inflation, conservatively. Using the future value of money 
formula: FV=PV × (1+i)n, even if fines were levied dollar for dollar, the future dollar 
value of fines paid in post-fraud years three to five would be between $941,192 and 
$903,920, respectively. Based on the amount of fraud committed, the top 100 contractors 
could see the benefits as worth the costs.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This paper includes an analysis of unclassified data that includes fraud fines and 
the fraud cases committed by DOD defense contractors. We utilize a regression analysis 
to assess 218 fraud firm-year observations and 803 non-fraud firm-year observations 
between the years 2012 and 2017, along with associated fraud fine penalties paid by 
those same firms. The results of our analysis showed coefficients that were insignificant 
and economically near zero from an effects standpoint. The incorporation of one-to five-
year lag variations of variables did not impact findings, but confirmed them. Based on 
our findings, we were unable to reject our null hypothesis that fraud fines have no impact 
on the firm-fraud behavior of defense companies. 
There are several potential factors that have an influence on our results. Fraud fine 
amounts paid by defense contractors are likely too low in comparison to the profit 
potential of committing fraud against the DOD. Second, there have been numerous 
changes in DOD and DOJ policy that have affected the focus on fraud. Third, since 2001, 
there have been numerous changes in procurement spending, which impacts the fraud 
environment through volume. Lastly, the effect of time on the value of money may 
provide an incentive for defense firms to commit fraud with a near assurance that 
penalties will not be imposed for three to five years. The time delay decreases the 
magnitude of the fine effect. Despite the potential factors that may have an effect on our 
results, the results themselves are significant and suggest that additional measures be 
evaluated by the DOD and DOJ. 
Additional research should be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of fraud 
penalties outside of post-occurrence fines. Potential measures for research could include a 
fraud-risk multiplier effect to be applied to future contract activities with defense 
companies who historically present the greatest fraud risk. Second, an earned price 
reduction on an immediate contract activity following an instance of fraud, similar to a 
coupon, could be applied by the DOD. Third, the DOD could create a fraud-risk 
reduction plan and impose it on defense firms that present the greatest fraud risk. Plan 
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requirements could include additional accounting reviews, quality control measures, 
government-administered fraud training, and program-level fraud hotlines for specific 
contracts.  
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